were more erratic, rising annually until 1964, then registering significant falls in both 1965 and 1967, and finally bouncing back to more than regain their lost ground at the end of the decade. This reflected the volatility of the Italian and French markets in particular, the latter constituting the EEC's largest importer of Australian produce in all years other than 1967.
Despite the fact that European imports from Australia grew more slowly and more erratically than EEC exports, however, the Community ran a trade deficit with the Australians throughout the decade except for in 1968 (Figure 1 ).
The difficulty from the Australian government's point of view, however, sprang not from this moderately satisfactory, if shrinking, trade surplus, but rather from the relative importance which these figures assumed in the overall trade patterns of Australia and the 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
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EEC Imports EEC Exports The Community's trade policy in the 1960s was deeply shaped by political considerations, however, and so by themselves the raw figures cited above need not have led the EEC to neglect its ties to Australia. After all the 1960s EEC devoted much more time and money to Europe's farmers than either their economic or demographic importance would warrant, and similarly lavished a great deal of economic and political attention on a series of African and Caribbean countries whose trade flows with the Community were much lower than those of Australia. 4 Had there been political motives to nurture the bonds with Australia, the EEC might well have been more attentive, notwithstanding the relatively small value and volume of the trade. But unfortunately for Canberra political factors only worsened Australia's position rather than improving it.
For the EEC in its formative years, at least four categories of political consideration affected its trade policy. The first of these centred on the geographical distance between the EEC and the trading partner in question, with a distinctly positive bias being adopted towards those countries and areas which were near neighbours of the EEC. repeated deputations to Brussels, the US had little success in its attempts to persuade the Community to alter its putative agricultural policy in a more liberal direction. 15 If not even the US could divert Europe from its chosen path, a country like Australia, with far fewer political and economic bargaining counters at its disposal, stood little chance of making any difference at all.
The stark reality in the 1960s thus appeared to be that Australia would have next to no capacity to bargain commercially with Europe. Its market was just too small and marginal from Europe's perspective for any reciprocal deal to be likely, it was too distant, too stable and too wealthy to win the sympathy of European officials or politicians, and its traditional sales to Europe were concentrated in sectors which were either declining naturally or which were likely to bear the brunt of the EEC's agricultural protectionism. Despite the best efforts of the Australian delegation in Brussels, there thus appeared to be little Canberra could do to safeguard its sales in Europe, and instead it would have to place its faith in the multilateral liberalisation process underway through GATT, and in the increased sales which might result from Western Europe's ever-growing prosperity. Direct efforts to tilt the uneven playing field back in Australia's favour were exceedingly unlikely to have an effect.
The British Effect
That EEC officials and ministers did in fact spend a considerable amount of time debating trade policy towards Australia in the early 1960s, is entirely due to Britain's 1961 application to join the Community. Macmillan's decision to submit a membership bid transformed the situation, elevating the issue of trade flows between Western Europe and Australia from a marginal concern, handled at most by a clutch of junior officials, into a problem of political significance, worthy of lengthy ministerial debate and the subject of detailed analysis by the European Commission. 16 Quite why this transformation should have been so acute is explained by the manner in which most of the Six reacted to the prospect of British membership and the fashion in which the British government chose to approach Brussels.
The overwhelming majority of EEC leaders warmly welcomed Britain's 1961
decision. There is no scope here to analyse this reaction in detail, but it is enough to point out that the governments of five out of the six Community member states greeted with enthusiasm the idea of EEC enlargement, while those leaders who did harbour misgivings, de Gaulle of course, but also Konrad Adenauer, the German Chancellor, and Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission, were initially unable to express their doubts in the face of so clear a pro-British consensus. 17 Such enthusiasm meant that any concerns that Britain chose to raise were likely to be taken very seriously by the Community. As a result, the Six had to pay a great deal of attention to the three special groups whose interests, Commonwealth produce to enter the EEC without hindrance. They therefore backed up this general statement with a number of more specific requests which focused on the needs of particular Commonwealth members. As far as Australian interests were concerned there were three relevant parts to Britain's opening bid. The first, and the weakest, centred on the relatively small volume of Australian manufactured products which enjoyed a preferential position on the British market. On these, Heath was obliged to acknowledge that 'the indefinite and unlimited continuation of free entry over the whole of this field may not be regarded as compatible with the development of the common market and we are willing to discuss ways of reconciling these two conflicting notions'. 22 Before the talks with the Six had even begun, the British were hence all but admitting that the status quo for Australian exporters of manufactured products would have to change. For a second, rather more important group of products, ranging from lead and a variety of mineral products to tinned fruit, and (to the joy of satirists) canned kangaroo, the British suggested that the easiest solution would be for the Community's Common External Tariff (CET) to be set at nought.
23
Predictably, they became known in the jargon which quickly surrounded the negotiations as the 'zero tariff items'. And the third, and most important category of Australian exports, were France's desire to safeguard the nascent CAP, to limit to an absolute minimum the number of exemptions allowed to the Community's external tariff, and to prevent the Community from opening itself up to undue external competition, seemed to prevail over Germany's declared aim of smoothing Britain's path into the EEC and ensuring that the EEC remained as liberal as possible. Australia in particular found that scant attention appeared to be paid to its commercial interests. It is therefore important to establish why the Six proved so much less forthcoming towards the Australians than had initially been hoped.
Part of the problem reflected the economic and political difficulties which Australian exports posed to the Community. Of all the Commonwealth goods discussed at such length during the 1961-3 negotiations, three products of direct interest to Australia proved amongst the most intractable. Tinned fruit constituted the first problematic category, since the acute sensitivity of the Australian and British governments on the issue (the canning industry had been used to provide employment for a large number of war veterans; the potential for embarrassing headlines and emotive Parliamentary speeches was thus exceptionally high) collided head on with the economic self-interest of the Italians, in the early 1960s still the poorest of the Six. It was thus quickly made clear to Heath and his fellow negotiators that to reduce the CET to zero on these imports was not a viable option. Apart from anything else, an elimination of this tariff would most probably allow large US companies to gain a dominant position in the European market, an outcome which was in the interest of neither Europe nor Australia. Equally difficult was lead, another item the British hoped could be allowed to enter the Community without encountering a tariff barrier. Here too the Community felt unable to be liberal. The appropriate tariff level for the metal had been one of the issues the Six had been unable to agree about during the negotiations setting up the Community and it had been placed on the so-called List G, a series of tariff positions on which the Six agreed to disagree. Their internal divisions on the lead tariff had only been overcome in 1960, after delicate and lengthy negotiations, and there was no desire whatsoever on the part of the EEC member states to reopen so recent a bargain. Once again, therefore the British 'solution' stood no chance of being adopted. And most difficult of all was the issue of Australia's wheat exports. Unlike the hard wheat that Canada sold to Britain, the soft wheat produced by Australia was in direct competition with that grown in France. 30 While the Canadians could thus look forward to a degree of openness on the part of the Six, the Australians had far less reason to be optimistic. France was extremely unlikely to allow Britain to go on buying its wheat primarily from Australia, since to do so would not only deprive French farmers of a valuable new market, but might also encourage other states to seek exceptions to the CAP rules. In particular, the Germans might step up their campaign to limit agricultural trade within the EEC and to be allowed to continue their traditional habit of buying much of their food from non-European suppliers. Were this to happen French access to the large German market -one of the key benefits which the CAP was meant to deliverwould be called into question. Generosity towards Australia was hence much too expensive for France to contemplate, even without de Gaulle's more political misgivings about British membership.
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As important, however, was the way that the political calculations underpinning EEC trade policy which were analysed above continued to count against Australia even after the British had applied. In the eyes of the Six, the three former dominions were the Commonwealth members least deserving of European liberalism. Trade concessions towards India, Jamaica, or Nigeria could be largely justified on the grounds that the EEC, as a wealthy group of countries, had a duty to show generosity towards much poorer developing countries. 32 As explained above such sentiments were underpinned by political and humanitarian considerations as well as possible long-term economic gains. But it was much harder for the Six to see why they should forego some of the economic benefits which EEC enlargement might bring, or still worse take steps which could threaten the economic integration upon which they had already agreed, in order to help three countries as wealthy, as prosperous and as distant as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. As one Commission official commented to a British journalist in the course of the negotiations, New Zealand farmers were 'millionaires compared with the peasants of Calabria'. 33 The same reasoning could be applied to the farmers of Australia and Canada also. In the case of New Zealand, however, such sentiments were tempered by a recognition that the whole of the country's economy was unduly dependent on agricultural sales to Britain. So great a portion of New Zealand's trade would be compromised were the CAP to be immediately applied, that many within the Community were prepared to acknowledge the need to soften the blow. There was hence a strong lobby among the Six, led significantly by the still influential Jean Monnet, who 30 All of these problems were explored in some detail in the so-called September, but neither felt able to demand a renegotiation. 38 Both recognised, moreover, that the key agreements still lay in the future.
Matters grew still worse from an Australian point of view in August 1962 when details emerged of the likely deal on temperate zone agricultural products. Strictly speaking, the British were correct to assert that no definitive arrangement had been decided. Despite strenuous efforts by all of those involved in the Brussels negotiations, the August ministerial meeting had been adjourned without a final deal being done. But while a few details did still remain uncertain, the fundamental shape of an agreement had been settled -Heath indeed told the Cabinet that the document drawn up could be 'considered to contain acceptable provisions for the interests of the Commonwealth countries concerned.' 39 It can therefore be taken as an accurate indication of how far the Six were willing to go in order to accommodate Australia's agricultural exporters.
At the heart of the agreement lay the principle that Britain would participate fully in the CAP and would therefore introduce the levy system on all of its food imports. This potential blow to Australia was softened, however, by a number of EEC concessions. First of all the Six declared themselves willing to allow Commonwealth exporters to benefit from the levy reductions (known as the abattement forfetaire) in all member state markets which had been designed to give producers from elsewhere in the EEC an edge over third country exporters. The Commonwealth countries, in other words, would initially be treated as if they were EEC insiders. Such privileges would, however, dwindle over time (the exact rate of 'degressivity' remained to be agreed) and would in all events vanish by 1970 once the CAP system was fully up and running and the abattement forfetaire would cease to apply. After this date Commonwealth producers would have to put their trust in two further pledges. The first was the Six's declaration that the Community remained ready and willing to work actively towards the conclusion of world wide commodity agreements, addressing the global problem of agricultural surpluses. And the second was the commitment to set a 'reasonable' price for cereals within the CAP. 40 This last mattered greatly, since the level of common price selected by the EEC would to a very large extent determine the level of the EEC's own production of agricultural produce, and hence also affect the amount of space in the enlarged Community's market which remained for outside producers such as Australia. The EEC also acknowledged the need to provide special assistance to New Zealand; no such concessions were likely to be forthcoming for either Australia or Canada.
The final element of the package deal concerning Australia and the other former Dominions -the deal on the 'zero-tariff items' -had not been concluded when the negotiations came to their premature end. Already, however, it had become clear that the Six would not agree to Britain's suggestion of setting the CET at nought. Instead, the UK and its
Commonwealth partners would have to content themselves with a mixture of tariff quotas, which would permit a fixed quantity of imports to enter the UK at a substantially reduced tariff rate, a series of smaller reductions in the CET for some of the lesser items, and the staggered introduction of the Community tariff for the remainder. Once again the Community's policy had been shaped by the twin principles that any special dispensation granted to the Commonwealth should be temporary and that Britain should be subject to almost the full range of Community rules from the moment of entry. Transitional arrangements were acceptable, but they were not in any way to call into question the UK's long term acceptance of the Treaty of Rome. By 1970, when the EEC's own transitional phase came to an end, Britain's preferential ties with its former Empire were to be no more than a memory.
These putative agreements were of course swept aside in January 1963 when General 
A Reprieve or a Missed Opportunity?
In the light of this rather harsh reality, it is not surprising that many in Australia were relieved when the French President barred Britain's path to Europe. Although it was recognised that the UK would probably still join in the long run, Australia would have several years more at least to adapt before the type of arrangements outlined about would apply to its sales in Britain. Diversification, while still necessary, could thus take place at a less frenetic pace.
Few tears were shed in Canberra after de Gaulle's press conference.
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With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is worth asking whether the postponement of British membership was so advantageous for Australia. In essence the key question is whether the stay of execution which the Australians obtained for their privileged position in the UK market place was not obtained at the expense of wider Australian trade with the European Community. The rationale for such speculation centres on the influence which the UK within the Community might have been able to exert over the CAP as drawn up in the years following the failure of the first application. As with all counterfactuals in history, the ideas that follow are impossible to prove; enough is known, however, about the Community's development during the 1960s for such speculation to be grounded on a relatively solid set of economic and political calculations.
Had the UK joined in 1963 it would have been able to exercise a significant influence on the CAP in its formative stage. The basic shape of the system, as set out in the January 1962 agreements, was admittedly all but fixed. One of the clearest points to emerge from the 1961-3 negotiations was that the Six were not prepared to undo what they had already done.
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But the levy system agreed upon in 1962 did not of itself mean that the EEC would produce ever more of its own food, thereby squeezing third country producers out of the European market. Whether this happened or not would largely depend upon the level at which European agricultural prices were set -something which the Community had not yet done in 1961-3. If they were low, close say to the prices which prevailed in France, many of Europe's marginal producers would disappear and those who were more efficient would face few incentives to overproduce. The EEC would therefore continue to import significant quantities of its food from outside of its borders. Australia, in common with all other major agricultural exporters, would hence be able retain a sizeable market share. A high price level, by contrast, would spur Western Europe towards self-sufficiency and overproduction, since even the most inefficient of European producers would continue to operate and the more productive farms would generate huge amounts of food irrespective of demand. Surpluses would be the inevitable result, and the existence of stock-piled European produce would not only all but rule out substantial imports from non-EEC suppliers, but would also have a disruptive effect on the wider world market, since the only manner in which they could be disposed of would be for them to be exported at a subsidised rate. It was thus greatly to Australia's disadvantage that the 15 December 1964 agreement on cereal price levels, the decision which would set the tone for all subsequent choices of price level, fixed a Community price which was much closer to the high German level than it was to the relatively low French price. 46 The
Community had taken a decisive step towards agricultural overproduction.
The effects on Australian exports were serious enough in the short to medium term and likely to be still more worrying in the longer term,. Sales of foodstuffs to Germany in particular had already been hit by the introduction of the CAP in 1962. Under a more liberal price regime, however, they might have been expected to bounce back strongly -as it was, their recovery was much less fast. (Figure 3 ) Furthermore, Australian sales of wheat, the one 46 For details of the 1964 agreement see Neville-Rolfe, The Politics of Agriculture, pp.230-1 commodity where Europe was already running a near-surplus, became still more volatile in the mid-1960s, all but vanishing altogether in 1964-5, and never regaining the heights they had reached at the start of the decade. 47 In the medium term this boded ill for the substantial Australian sales of barley and oats since European production of these commodities also was likely to rise. Nor was there much prospect of a compensatory increase in sales of meat or other foodstuffs of animal origin. Italian imports of meat from Australia had in fact briefly risen during the mid-1960s (a reflection of Italy's growing prosperity) but this trend had resulted in Italy being faced with a much larger than expected contribution to the CAP. 48 The
Italian government thus had every incentive to encourage its consumers to buy meat from European suppliers rather than from Australia, Argentina or the US. 49 The effects of the 1964 cereal price decision, and of the consolidation of the CAP in the years that followed, were therefore highly detrimental for all non-European agricultural exporters. From an Australian point of view, the prospects of diversifying the nature of its sales to Western Europe and diminishing the relative importance of wool exports, had been seriously undermined.
The nature of the 1964 decision might, however, have been very different had Britain been a member of the EEC. After all the British had no incentive whatsoever either to see European food prices rise (the increase in the cost of living was already a sensitive part of the European debate) or to see third country producers squeezed out of the EEC market. Their voice would hence have been added strongly to that of France and the Commission in favour of a much more moderate price level. Furthermore German calls for high prices would almost certainly have been constrained by the pledge about a 'reasonable' price policy which had been included in the temperate zone agricultural produce deal outlined above. As they had been amongst the most fervent advocates of enlargement, the Germans would have found it particularly difficult to disregard a central element in a package which they had been so eager 47 have addressed both of these disadvantages, and would have done so at a time when the Community's agricultural and commercial profile was still at a formative and hence very flexible stage. By 1973 when Britain did belatedly enter, the agricultural rules were by contrast all but set in stone and consequently next to impossible to alter. When the totality of Australia's sales to Western Europe are taken into account, rather than just the exports bound for the UK market, any sighs of relief heard in Canberra on the day that de Gaulle vetoed may thus have been rather premature.
